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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
RULON F. DEYOUNG,

Case No. 970601-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
As set forth in the opening Brief,1 the issues presented in
this matter involve a defendant's right to counsel under the
Sixth Amendment. The record reflects that while Appellant Rulon
DeYoung ("DeYoung") repeatedly invoked his right to the direct
assistance of counsel, his requests went unheeded.
The state argues, among other things, that vague references
to standby assistance served to constitute a proper waiver of
DeYoung's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The state's arguments
disregard State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998), which is
controlling. Heaton requires reversal of this case and remand for
a new trial.
ARGUMENT
THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT DEYOUNG DID NOT INVOKE THE RIGHT
TO SELF-REPRESENTATION. ALSO, THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO
TAKE A KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER COMPELS REVERSAL,
A. THE STATE CLAIMS THAT THE CIRCUIT COURT APPOINTED ROBIN
LJUNGBERG TO PROVIDE DEYOUNG WITH DIRECT REPRESENTATION IN
COURT PROCEEDINGS, WHILE THE RECORD SUPPORTS OTHERWISE.
The state claims that during circuit court proceedings,
x

The opening Brief of Appellant was filed by Salt Lake Legal
Defender Association ("LDA") as standby counsel for Appellant
Rulon DeYoung ("DeYoung").

Judge Nehring appointed Robin Ljungberg ("Ljungberg") to provide
DeYoung with direct legal representation. (State's Brief ("S.B.")
at 3-5, 14-15.) The state also claims that "[n]othing in the
record" supports LDA's assertion on appeal that Judge Nehring
appointed Ljungberg to serve in a standby capacity. (S.B. at 15.)
The state is incorrect.
The record supports that Judge Nehring appointed Ljungberg
to serve in such a capacity without first taking a proper waiver
from DeYoung. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918-19; (Brief of
Appellant, dated May 26, 1998 ("Brief of Appellant"), at 5-11).
During circuit court proceedings, the judge stated, "[W]hat I
think I'm going to do is to...authorize ...the appointment of Mr.
[Ljjungberg to continue in court with Mr. DeYoung to serve as

standby

counsel."

(R. 450-51 (emphasis added).)

The s t a t e

disregards the emphasized language. (S.B. at 14-15.) 2
Likewise, the state fails to acknowledge that the only other
reference in the proceedings to "standby counsel" is with regard
to Ljungberg serving in that capacity (R. 449) ; and that the
circuit court docket of the matter shows that Ljungberg was

2

It seems that under the state's interpretation of the
ruling, the only explanation for the "standby" reference is that
Judge Nehring in effect authorized DeYoung to serve in a standby
capacity. (R. 450-51.) Such an interpretation is unreasonable.
It would be unnecessary for the judge to authorize a lay
person to participate in his own case, and it would be
inappropriate for a judge to authorize a lay person to serve as
counsel (standby or otherwise) in a legal proceeding.
Thus, the only reasonable interpretation of the ruling is
advanced by LDA: Judge Nehring authorized "Mr. [Ljjungberg to
continue in court ... to serve as standby counsel." (R. 450-51.)
2

ordered "to continue as appt and standby counsel." (R. 245.) The
record supports that the circuit court appointed Ljungberg to
serve in a standby capacity.
Thus, the state is incorrect with regard to the status of
Ljungberg1s appointment in circuit court. Notwithstanding its
incorrect assertions about the posture of Ljungberg1s standby
appointment, the state's position emphasizes an important point:
During the circuit court proceedings, DeYoung did
right to self-representation and he did

not

not

invoke the

waive his right to

counsel. That is relevant to the appeal.
Indeed, whether the record plainly supports the standby
appointment or otherwise in circuit court may be inconsequential
to the outcome of this appeal. LDA has raised the matter to show
that enough was said in circuit court proceedings to lead
Ljungberg and DeYoung to believe that DeYoung was ordered to
proceed pro se with standby assistance. The matter was
transferred to the district court in that posture. When DeYoung
and Ljungberg represented to the district court that the circuit
court ordered Ljungberg to serve in a standby capacity, the
prosecutor did not correct that representation likely because he
also understood that to be the case. (See R. 1083:3-6.)
Also, when DeYoung's case was transferred to district court,
DeYoung never represented to Judge Stirba that he invoked the
right to self-representation or waived the right to counsel in
circuit court. (R. 1083:2-15.)

Rather, he represented the status

of the matter as he understood it: Ljungberg was appointed to
3

serve in a standby capacity. (Id.) Given Judge Stirba f s limited
information concerning the posture of the case, she should have
asked DeYoung "whether he wished to waive his right to counsel."
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 914. The judge failed to make that inquiry.3
B. THE STATE IS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY A STATEMENT BY DEYOUNG
CONSTITUTING A WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL OR INVOCATION
OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION IN THE DISTRICT COURT.
As set forth in the opening brief on appeal, when DeYoung
arrived in the district court, he did not "assert his right to
self-representation, and the judge did not ask [defendant]
whether he wished to waive his right to counsel."

State v.

Heaton, 958 P.2d at 914. Indeed, the state admits that DeYoung
specifically did not invoke the right to self-representation.
(S.B. at 24 ("defendant is correct that he also did not invoke
his right of self-representation in the strictest sense").)
Notwithstanding, the state seems to argue that because
DeYoung expressed concerns with respect to Ljungberg's services,
and because DeYoung represented that Ljungberg "could not
ethically present the defenses that defendant wanted to present"
(S.B. at 19), that was sufficient to invoke the right to self-

3

Even if DeYoung had waived the right to counsel in the
circuit court, that would have been irrelevant in the trial
court. A circuit court magistrate "does not sit as a judge of a
court and exercises none of the powers of a judge." State v.
Rodriguez-Lopi, 954 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah App. 1998) (citing
State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 467 (Utah 1991)). Also, the Utah
Supreme Court has placed "the important responsibility" of
determining waiver on the " t r i a l court."
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918.
Thus, the trial court judge must be responsible for asking
"whether [defendant] wished to waive his right to counsel." Id.
at 914.
4

representation or to waive the right to counsel. The state also
suggests that the mere use of the term "self-representation" by
DeYoung and/or Ljungberg was sufficient to allow the trial court
to deny DeYoung his right to the direct assistance of counsel
under the Sixth Amendment. (S.B. at 22 ("it was defendant and his
counsel Mr. Ljungberg who first raised the issue of selfrepresentation").)
The state's arguments are legally incorrect. (See S.B. at
22-25 (state fails to cite to controlling authority in support of
its proposition).) U.S. v. Kienenberqer, 13 F.3d 1354 (9th Cir.
1994), (relying on the Sixth Amendment, court found that
defendant did not relinquish the right to be represented by
counsel where his requests to proceed pro se "were not
unequivocal"). Complaints about counsel do not constitute a
waiver of the right to counsel, and they do not constitute an
invocation of the right to self-representation. See Heaton, 958
P.2d at 914-15. Likewise, the mere use of the term "selfrepresentation" or "standby" counsel is not sufficient to allow
the trial court to deny a defendant his right to the direct
assistance of counsel in a matter.4
4

Id.

The state claims that LDA's reliance on U.S. v.
Kienenberqer, 13 F.3d 1354 (9th Cir. 1994), is misplaced. LDA
relied on that case for the proposition that a defendant's
request for standby assistance does not constitute an invocation
of the right to self-representation.
In apparently "distinguishing" Kienenberqer from this
matter, the state admits that the facts in that case reflect that
defendant "repeatedly told the trial court he wanted to represent
himself, but that he wanted the 'assistance' of counsel to help
him with procedural matters." (S.B. at 23.) The state does not
(continued...)
5

In Heaton, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that during
hearings before the trial court the defendant complained about
his court-appointed attorney.
[Defendant] indicated that he did not feel he was receiving
adequate legal representation and that he felt forced to
proceed on his own. His attorney indicated that a "rift" had
developed between them, that he was uncomfortable going to
trial because of the "total conflict" between them, and that
he thought [defendant] wanted to represent himself.
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 913-14. The Utah Supreme Court considered
defendant's remarks and found that defendant "did not assert his
right to self-representation, and the judge did not ask
[defendant] whether he wished to waive his right to counsel." Id.
Where the trial court is considering complaints about
counsel and defendant's references to self-representation, the
Heaton court reminded trial judges that they must resolve
concerns in favor of defendant's right to counsel. There is a
"presumption against waiver, and doubts concerning waiver must be
resolved in the defendant's favor." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917

4

(...continued)
dispute the holding that although defendant made requests for
self-representation to the trial court, his requests were not
unequivocal. Defendant did not invoke the right to selfrepresentation since he simultaneously requested legal assistance
in the form of standby counsel. The state has acknowledged that
Kienenberger's statements for self-representation and
standby
assistance
failed to constitute an invocation of the right to
self-represent. (S.B. at 23.)
The Kienenberger result is consistent with Heaton, where all
doubts are resolved in favor of defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel. In Kienenberger, the trial court and appellate court
recognized Kienenberger was requesting some form of legal
assistance. The courts resolved Kienenberger's requests for legal
assistance in favor of his right to counsel. See Heaton, 958 P.2d
at 918.
6

(citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); U.S. v.
Williamson, 806 F. 2d 216, 220 (10th Cir. 1986)).
The state also argues that because DeYoung discussed his
understanding of the standby arrangement with Judge Stirba,
DeYoung "in effect waived his Sixth Amendment right to the full
representation by counsel" when "Judge Stirba granted his
request."5 (S.B. at 24.) That argument also must be rejected
under Heaton for the reasons stated above.

References to standby

counsel do not constitute waiver.
Also, in the context of this case, DeYoung made references
to the standby arrangement to explain his understanding of what
transpired in the circuit court. The references and discussions
concerning the arrangement were not presented to Judge Stirba in
the form of a "request" to waive counsel or to proceed pro se.
Specifically, the state relies on the following comments made by
Ljungberg and DeYoung during Judge Stirba's inquiry into the
matter.
First, the state relies on Ljungberg1s statements to the
trial court indicating DeYoung's "desire to represent himself."
(S.B. at 19.) Those statements do not constitute evidence of
DeYoung's position. See State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah
1990) (citing Leon Shaffer Golnick Adv., Inc. v. Cedar, 423 So.2d
1015, 1017 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (attorney's unsworn

5

The "request" identified by the state consists of DeYoung's request for legal assistance. The court did not provide
DeYoung with direct assistance, as it should, but ordered
Ljungberg to serve as standby counsel in the case.
7

statements are not evidence)); see also Heaton, 958 P.2d at 914
(counsel told trial court that he thought defendant wanted to
represent himself; defendant did not assert right to selfrepresentation and he did not waive counsel); State v. Galli, 345
Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 11 (Utah 1998) (statements of defense counsel
are insufficient to constitute admission on the part of
defendant). In addition, on issues of constitutional importance,
counsel's remarks cannot be sufficient to constitute defendant's
acquiescence in the matter. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,
1313 (Utah 1987) (citing Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 650
(1976) (J., White concurring) (lawyer cannot make admission for
defendant)). Thus, Ljungberg's comments are irrelevant.
Next, the state considers DeYoung's remarks to Judge Stirba.
DeYoung's comments, as reflected in the State's Brief, are
emphasized in each point identified by LDA below:
•
Judge Stirba asked DeYoung if Ljungberg was his counsel
or if he wished Ljungberg "to be standby counsel." DeYoung's
answer was not responsive. Rather, he proceeded to explain
to Judge Stirba his understanding as to how the matter was
resolved in the circuit court:
Your Honor, on our January roll call before Judge
Nehrinq, it was determined in that hearing that, in
meeting with Mr. Ljungberg that morning, Mr. Ljungberg
was not a -- familiar with tax law. And seeing that the
charges by the State in this matter is pertaining to
tax law, there are several issues that I have as a
defense that I would like to present to the Court.
(S.B. at 19-20 (quoting R. 1083:4).) That statement cannot
be construed as sufficient to constitute a waiver of the
right to counsel or an invocation of the right to selfrepresentation.
•
Next, DeYoung stated that "Judge Nehring did rule to
the effect that I would be able to represent myself as a
citizen in party and have Mr. Ljungberg as standby counsel."
8

(S.B. at 20.) That statement likewise is not enough. DeYoung
was merely explaining to Judge Stirba what had happened in
the circuit court proceedings as he understood it.
•
DeYoung next expressed that he understood his right to
counsel (S.B. at 20), and he stated "I have asked the
previous court for counsel that could represent me in
regards to tax matters." (Id.; R. 1083:5.) DeYoung also
disclosed that he could not afford an attorney. Those
statements support DeYoung's request for counsel.
•
When the court followed up by asking DeYoung if he
needed counsel appointed to represent him, DeYoung stated
the following:
To my understanding, Mr. -- and with the understanding
that I have with Mr. Liungberg, he is willing to assist
me in regards to the presence of the Court, Mr.
Liungberg expressed that morning in that meeting that
there are certain issues that he would have problems in
presenting before the Court...And, therefore, he is he admitted or agreed that he would assist.
(S.B. at 20 (cites R. 1083:6).) Again, DeYoung related what
had transpired in earlier proceedings, and he explained
Ljungberg's discomfort. Those statements do not constitute
waiver of the right to counsel and they do not support
invocation of the right to self-representation.
•
DeYoung's next statement to the court reflected his
desire to have counsel appointed to represent him: "I would
hope to be able to have representation to the quality that I
would be able to bring forth the issues on the tax matters
that I'm entitled to." (S.B. at 21; R. 1083:7.) DeYoung
also answered in the affirmative when Judge Stirba asked if
he would like counsel with an expertise in tax and criminal
law. (S.B. at 21; R. 1083:7-8.)
•
Thereafter, the judge explored DeYoung's educational
background and asked if DeYoung thought that representing
himself "is a better way for you to proceed, in light of
your concerns and your issues." (S.B. at 22; R. 1083:11.)
DeYoung again expressed that Ljungberg was uncomfortable
with issues that DeYoung felt needed to be raised.
(S.B. at
22; R. 1083:12.)
Overall, the colloquy reflected that DeYoung felt strongly
about his case, he believed Ljungberg was uncomfortable with

9

certain issues, DeYoung appreciated and desired legal assistance,
and DeYoung hoped to have representation of counsel who would be
able to "bring forth the issues on the tax matters that [he was]
entitled to." (R. 1083:5-14.) DeYoung was told he was not
entitled to a tax expert, then the court proceeded as though the
only option available was self-representation. The circumstances
set forth in the record do not constitute "waiver" of the right
to counsel or "invocation" of the right to self-represent.
In this matter, the trial court failed in its duty to
"jealously protect []" the defendant's constitutional right to
counsel. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917. As set forth in Heaton,
The right to have the assistance of counsel in a criminal
trial is a fundamental constitutional right which must be
jealously protected by the trial court. The United States
Supreme Court has stated:
The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by
counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court,
in which the accused -- whose life or liberty is at stake --

is without counsel. This protecting
duty imposes the
serious and weighty responsibility
upon the trial judge of
determining whether there is an intelligent
and competent
waiver by the accused.
Id. (emphasis in original; cites Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465).
The record shows that in this case, Judge Stirba was so
entrenched in her beliefs that DeYoung desired to proceed pro se
that she was unwilling to take any additional information about
the matter into consideration, including DeYoung's clear
statements that "I have asked the previous court for counsel that
could represent me in regards to tax matters;" "I would hope to
be able to have representation to the quality that I would be
10

able to bring forth the issues on the tax matters that I'm
entitled to;" and that DeYoung would like an attorney appointed
to the matter who had expertise in tax law and some criminal
expertise as well. (R. 1083:7-8.) The trial court violated its
duty to safeguard DeYoung's constitutional rights.
C. IN DISCUSSING THE COLLOQUY IN THIS CASE, THE STATE
APPLIES A SELF-SERVING, NARROW INTERPRETATION TO HEATON THAT
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS OF THAT CASE.
As set forth in the opening Brief, since DeYoung did not
invoke the right to self-representation and he did not waive the
right to counsel, there was no basis for a colloquy. (See Brief
of Appellant, at 13.) Nevertheless, the trial court engaged in a
limited inquiry. The state acknowledges that the colloquy was
deficient (S.B. at 26-28, 34), but claims the deficiencies are of
no consequence.

The state conveniently disregards language in

Heaton relevant to the colloquy, and/or interprets that case in a
manner that is inconsistent with the facts set forth in the
opinion.
Specifically, in Frampton, the Utah Supreme Court stated
that a colloquy

on the record between the court and defendant is

the preferred method of determining whether defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived the right to counsel. State v. Frampton,
737 P.2d 183, 187-88 n. 12 (Utah 1987). The Frampton court
identified a 16-point colloquy for use by trial courts. Id.
In Heaton, the Utah Supreme Court stated that the trial
court must advise defendant through use of the colloquy of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation "so that the
11

record will establish that "he knows what he is doing and his
choice is made with eyes open. 1 " Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918 (quoting
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)). The Heaton
court addressed three areas of importance to the colloquy:
The trial court should (1) advise the defendant of his
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, as well
as his constitutional right to represent himself; (2)
ascertain that the defendant possesses the intelligence and
capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of
the decision to represent himself, including the expectation
that the defendant will comply with technical rules and the
recognition that presenting a defense is not just a matter
of telling one's story; and (3) ascertain that the defendant
comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings, the
range of permissible punishments, and any additional facts
essential to a broad understanding of the case.
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918; see also State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724,
732-33 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991);
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-88 n. 12; State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d
629, 636 (Utah App.), rev ! d on other grounds per curiam, 862 P.2d
1354 (Utah 1993); Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464; U.S. v. Padilla, 819
F.2d 952, 956 (10th Cir. 1987).
The court in Heaton clarified that if the trial court failed
to engage in "such a colloquy," the reviewing court "will look at
the record and make a de novo determination regarding the
validity of the defendant's waiver only in extraordinary
circumstances, the existence of which we will address on a caseby-case basis." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918.
In this matter, the state acknowledges that the trial court
at least failed to explain "the nature of the charges, the
possible penalties defendant faced if convicted, and a warning
that the trial court would not advise defendant on how to
12

proceed." (S.B. at 28.)

That is, the trial court failed to

perform the inquiry as directed in Heaton and Frampton, to "(3)
ascertain that the defendant comprehends the nature of the
charges and proceedings, the range of permissible punishments,
and any additional facts essential to a broad understanding of
the case."

Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918.

The state does not deny the importance of that particular
aspect of the colloquy, likely because case law emphasizes it.
In Frampton, the court considered defendant's background
information to be relevant but not dispositive as to whether
defendant understood the relative advantages and disadvantages of
self-representation. Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188. Rather, the
record must show that "defendant understood the seriousness of
the charges and knew the possible maximum penalty."

Id.; Heaton,

958 P.2d at 918.
Since the trial court's colloquy here failed to explore
those importance issues, the analysis ends and the case must be
reversed. The state disagrees and asserts that this Court may
review the record in its entirety to make up for the deficient
colloquy. As set forth below, the state's argument is incorrect.
1. The State Improperly Urges This Court to Review the
Entire Record to Find a Valid Waiver.
According to the state, the deficient colloquy is of no
consequence because this Court may review the record in its
entirety to determine whether DeYoung understood the nature of
the charges, the proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and any additional facts essential to a broad under13

standing of the case. Yet, Heaton rejects such a review of the
record. According to the court in Heaton, in the absence of "such
a colloquy" as set forth in Heaton and Frampton, a reviewing
court will look to the record for waiver "only in extraordinary
circumstances." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918.
The state disregards the plain language of Heaton and claims
a reviewing court is allowed to consider the entire record for
waiver except "when no colloquy or warnings are given by the
trial court." (S.B. at 34 (emphasis in original).) The state's
interpretation is inconsistent with the facts set forth in
Heaton.
In that case, after defendant complained about his
attorney's representation, the trial court engaged in a limited
colloquy by advising the defendant with respect to his right to
self-representation, and recommending to defendant that he rely
on counsel John Caine's expertise in the matter. Heaton, 958 P.2d
at 918-19. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Caine to serve
in Heaton's case in a standby capacity. Id. at 913-14 and 918-19.
The trial court's advice consisted of a partial colloquy as
set forth in Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918 (during the colloquy, the
court should advise defendant of his constitutional right to
represent himself) and Frampton, 737 P.2d 187-88 n.12.
The Utah Supreme Court assessed the limited colloquy and
stated that while the advice was "certainly appropriate", "it
addressed only one of the disadvantages of self-representation."
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 919. Thus, the incomplete colloquy was
14

deficient. Further, the limited colloquy did not open the door to
an examination of the entire record to determine waiver. That
door opened only in extraordinary circumstances. "There are no
extraordinary circumstances in this case which would justify our
examination of the record and making a de novo determination as
to whether Heaton knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
counsel." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 919. Heaton supports that where the
trial court fails to engage in "such a colloquy" as directed -that is, a colloquy that includes advising defendant of the
nature of the charges and the range of permissible punishments -the reviewing court will not look to the record to make up for
the deficiencies, absent extraordinary circumstances.
For all practical purposes DeYoung's case is
indistinguishable from Heaton's case. Here, as in Heaton, the
trial court engaged in a deficient and limited colloquy, (see
S.B. at 26-28, 34), ordered defendant to proceed pro se and
appointed an attorney to assist in a standby capacity. As in
Heaton, "[T]here are no extraordinary circumstances in this case"
which would justify this Court's review of the record to
determine whether defendant "knowingly and intelligently waived
his right to counsel." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 919.
2. The State Relies on the Pleadings and Conversations That
Supposedly Took Place off the Record to Assert that a Review
of the Record Supports a Knowing and Voluntary Waiver.
According to the state, the record supports that DeYoung
understood the nature of the charges and proceedings, the range
of permissible punishments, and any additional facts essential to
15

a broad understanding of the case because he sat through the
preliminary hearing, the circuit court read the charging document
to DeYoung placing him "on clear notice that he could incur
serious penalties in the event he was convicted," and Ljungberg
informed the court that he met with DeYoung to discuss the case.
(S.B. at 34-35.) According to the state, "Between the colloquy
and the record, therefore, there can be no doubt that defendant
was well aware of the consequences of his choice to proceed pro
se and any dangers or disadvantages in his doing so." (S.B. at
34-35.)
The state essentially is asking this Court to find that
indefinite references in the record support the specific
determination that DeYoung knowingly and intelligently waived his
right to counsel. Heaton does not support such a result. Heaton,
958 P.2d at 918-19; see also Strozier v. Newsome, 871 F.2d 995,
999 (11th Cir. 1989) (record failed to reflect content of
conferences relevant to defendant's waiver of counsel; thus, the
record was ambiguous, contradictory and in some instance "the
facts [were] just not there"; case reversed for a clear record
regarding the matter).
With respect to the state's claim that the charging document
and DeYoung's attendance at the preliminary hearing placed him on
notice of the nature of the charges, the state ignores important
facts in the record. The state disregards that in connection with
the counts set forth in the Information, DeYoung was never
arraigned and was never asked whether he comprehended the nature
16

of the charges. (See Brief or Appellant at 16, n.4.)
In addition, throughout the proceedings in the circuit and
district courts, DeYoung made repeated requests for a bill of
particulars concerning the charges, clarification on the charges
and/or the entry of an order dismissing the matter or quashing
the bindover for failing to "state a proper cause of action."
(See R. 34-161; 162-76; 216-19; 235-38; 250-75; 292-94; 312-15.)
The filings defy the notion that DeYoung comprehended the nature
of the offenses. Further, since the trial court ordered the state
to amend six of the counts on the second day of trial (R.
1044:278-79), there was no opportunity for DeYoung to understand
the nature of the charges at the time of the colloquy. See
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 919 (trial court must determine complete
waiver at the time that defendant proceeds pro se, not after).
With respect to the penalties, the state does not deny that
DeYoung was never informed of the range of permissible
punishments he faced if convicted of each offense.

See Frampton,

737 P.2d 187-88 n.12; Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918. Rather, the state
argues that DeYoung should have been on notice of the penalties
based on the manner in which each count was charged in the
Information. (S.B. at 34; see R. 9-13.)
The state's argument makes language in Heaton and Frampton
superfluous. If the Information satisfied the trial court's duty
to advise the defendant of the nature of the charges and range of
permissible punishments, portions of the colloquy would be
unnecessary. See Frampton, 737 P.2d 187-88 and n.12; Heaton, 958
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P.2d at 918. In addition, in DeYoungfs case, the Information
simply identified the level or degree of each offense as second
or third degree felony offenses.

The Information did not

identify the penalty associated with such offenses. (R. 9-13.)
Thus, there was no reason to believe that DeYoung understood the
range of permissible punishments here based on the Information.
With respect to the punishment, Judge Stirba represented
that she would recommend probation for DeYoung; she did not
indicate that the filing of a "frivolous" motion may cause her to
revoke that recommendation. That additional fact was important to
DeYoung's understanding of the range of permissible punishments
in this case.

Since DeYoung was not advised of facts essential

to his understanding of the matter, he was not aware that his
filings would cause the judge to abandon the probation
recommendation. (See Brief of Appellant at 16-17.)
The state considered Ljungberg1s representations to the
court -- that he had discussed trial strategy and constitutional
matters with DeYoung -- as a compelling basis for finding that
DeYoung understood the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation. (S.B. at 35.) Ljungberg's representations should
not be allowed to take the place of record support for the
matter. See Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-13;6 Strozier, 871 F.2d at
6

A comparison may be drawn here to the entry of a plea under
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. In taking a Rule 11
plea, a trial court is obligated to inquire whether defendant has
knowingly and intelligently waived specific constitutional
rights, including "[t]hat if defendant is not represented by
counsel he has knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not
(continued...)
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999 (not only did record fail to reflect the content of the
conference, but there was no way of knowing from the record what
advice standby counsel gave to defendant). Indeed, because the
record is silent with respect to the content of those
discussions, they do not assist in the analysis of determining
whether DeYoung comprehended the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation. See Strozier, 871 F.2d at 998 (in
determining a knowing and intelligent waiver, the question is
what did the defendant understand). Ljungberg's representations
to the court without more cannot be sufficient to find that
DeYoung knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.
Finally, the state asserts that "several other courts [] have
recognized that the presence of standby counsel" is a
"significant safeguard that offsets some of [a] colloquy's
deficiencies." (S.B. at 30.) In support of that assertion the
state relies mostly on early cases from other state courts. (Id.)

6

(...continued)
desire counsel." Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312. The trial court also
must ensure that the defendant understands the nature of the
charges against him. Id. at 1312-13.
As in Heaton, Rule 11 squarely places on the trial court the
burden of ensuring an intelligent, knowing waiver and plea. To
that end, the court in Gibbons stated " [T]he law places the
burden of establishing compliance with those requirements on the
trial judge. It is not sufficient to assume that defense
attorneys make sure that their clients fully understand" the
matter. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313.
The same burden applies to trial judges in taking a wavier
of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Heaton, 958
P. 2d at 918-19. It should not be sufficient under Heaton to
assume that standby counsel has made the necessary inquiry to
determine whether defendant fully understands the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation, especially where that duty
belongs to the trial court.
19

Those cases are not controlling here.
The Utah Supreme Court in Heaton refused to recognize that
standby assistance made up for an incomplete inquiry. In that
case, although the trial judge appointed an attorney to serve in
a standby capacity, Heaton, 958 P.2d at 914, the Utah Supreme
Court ruled there were no extraordinary circumstances that would
allow that court to look beyond the colloquy to find waiver. Id.
at 919. Thus, according to Heaton, the appointment of standby
counsel will not make up for deficiencies in the colloquy. Heaton
controls here. This Court is precluded from looking beyond the
deficient colloquy to find support in the record for waiver.
D. THE STATE CONSIDERS STANDBY ASSISTANCE TO BE AS
BENEFICIAL AS DIRECT ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. NEITHER THE LAW
NOR THE FACTS OF THIS CASE SUPPORT THAT POSITION.
According to the state, "the defendant who receives the
active assistance of standby counsel does not truly give up all
the advantages and benefits of the representation of counsel."
(S.B. at 31.)

The state disregards language relevant to that

issue as set forth in U.S. v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.
1991), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 883 (1991):
Given the limited role that a standby attorney plays, we
think it clear that the assistance of standby counsel, no
matter how useful to the court or the defendant, cannot
qualify as the assistance of counsel required by the Sixth
Amendment. There can be no question that the roles of
standby counsel and full-fledged defense counsel are
fundamentally different. The very definition of fullfledged counsel includes the proposition that the counselor,
and not the accused, bears the responsibility for the
defense; by contrast, the key limitation on standby counsel
is that such counsel not be responsible -- and not be
perceived to be responsible -- for the accused's defense.
Id. at 312; Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1231 (5th Cir.
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1997) ("We emphasized in Taylor that '[s]tandby counsel does not
represent the defendant1.... Rather, his role is one of an 'observer, an attorney who attends the proceeding and who may offer
advice, but who does not speak for the defendant or bear responsibility for his defense'"); see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465
U.S. 168, 177-78 (1984) (the proper role of standby is quite
limited); Heaton, 958 P.2d at 919.
In its brief, the state suggests Ljungberg's standby
assistance allowed DeYoung to realize the benefits and advantages
of direct assistance. To make its point, the state refers to
portions of the record reflecting ways in which Ljungberg
assisted DeYoung.

(S.B. at 10-11, 32.)

As the state points out,

Ljungberg filed a Notice of Intent to Rely on Defendant's
Diminished Capacity, which was later withdrawn, and a request for
extension of time; during hearings Ljungberg summed up DeYoung's
arguments; and during trial Ljungberg invoked the witness
exclusionary rule, assisted DeYoung in making objections, made a
motion to dismiss at the end of the state's case-in-chief, and
argued for the inclusion of portions of DeYoung1s proposed jury
instructions. (See S.B. at 10-11, 32.)
The state has identified 1 page in 1070 from the pleadings
file that was submitted by Ljungberg (the Notice which was later
withdrawn); summations by Ljungberg that did not necessarily
involve arguing additional substance; and contributions from
Ljungberg during trial that did not involve anything more than
observing a case for which Ljungberg had no direct responsibility
21

for investigation, preparation, or trial. Ljungberg provided
adequate standby assistance. That is not in issue. Ljungberg was
not required to assist with substantive matters, and therefore,
did not provide the constitutionally guaranteed assistance of
counsel.
Overall, the state cites to approximately 90 pages in the
record where Ljungberg was involved in restating DeYoung's
positions and arguments, or making routine objections and trial
requests. The record consists of more than 24 00 pages;
Ljungberg1s "active and zealous standby assistance" as identified
by the state (S.B. at 10-22, 30, 32) is reflected in less than 4%
of the record.
Meanwhile, DeYoung repeatedly implored the court to address
his motions, he struggled with witness examinations and his own
testimony, and he drew so many objections during his opening
statement that he ultimately waived it. DeYoung also
inadvertently compromised the judge's probation recommendation
with his "frivolous" filing. DeYoung did not realize the benefits
or the advantages of having direct assistance at trial.
Ljungberg1s limited role was appropriate given his standby
status. The standby status did not satisfy Sixth Amendment
standards. Taylor, 933 F.2d 312.
E. THE STATE CORRECTLY RECOGNIZES THAT JUDGE STIRBA
ESSENTIALLY TREATED DEYOUNG'S LATER REQUESTS FOR COUNSEL AS
REQUESTS FOR SUBSTITUTE STANDBY ASSISTANCE. THAT WAS
IMPROPER.
The state makes important acknowledgments with respect to
DeYoung's re-invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
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The state recognizes that after DeYoung filed papers with the
trial court asserting that he refused to waive any constitutional
right to counsel (R. 652-53; 671; 686-87), Judge Stirba asked
DeYoung simply "to address his concerns regarding Mr. Ljungberg
as standby counsel."

(S.B. at 37 (cites R. 1083:96-100).) As the

state points out, in response, DeYoung argued that he had a
"contract of those constitutional rights" with the court and that
he "demanded his Constitutional rights.1" (S.B. at 37.)
As the state acknowledges, the "judge responded that
criminal defendants have many constitutional rights, including
the right to counsel, 'if you choose to have counsel.1" (S.B. at
37.) DeYoung responded with, "Thank you, Your Honor." (R.
1083:99.) The judge then changed gears and focused on Ljungberg!s
standby assistance. (R. 1083:100.)
As the state points out, the judge "essentially treated"
DeYoung's assertions for counsel as a request for substitute
standby counsel. (S.B. at 37-38.) Without further inquiry into
DeYoung's assertions that he refused to waive any constitutional
right to counsel, the judge asked DeYoung to identify his
concerns with Ljungberg's assistance. (S.B. at 38.)

Thereafter,

the judge "found that Ljungberg was providing reasonable
representation as standby counsel."

(S.B. at 38; R. 1083:116.)

According to the state, notwithstanding DeYoung's clear
assertions that he refused to waive any constitutional rights to
counsel, DeYoung did not "invoke his right to counsel" because he
failed to further insist that the trial court consider his plain
23

requests. (S.B. at

38.) The state is incorrect. DeYoung invoked

the right to counsel. The trial court's failure to properly
regard DeYoung's plain requests constituted legal error. DeYoung
was not required to do any more with regard to the matter.
Here, the trial court's treatment of DeYoung's request for
his constitutional right to counsel raises serious
considerations. Plainly, DeYoung requested counsel pursuant to
his constitutional rights. Because the trial judge refused even
to consider that DeYoung was reasserting his right to counsel,
the judge again violated the trial court's duty to "jealously
protect []" a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to direct
assistance. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917.
In addition, the state suggests that DeYoung's request for
counsel really amounted to a request to have "someone whom he
viewed to be a tax expert [to] assist him at trial."
3 9.)

(S.B. at

The clear language of DeYoung!s requests fails to support

such an interpretation. To the extent the request was ambiguous,
the judge was required at least to inquire into the matter and to
resolve all doubts in favor of DeYoung's right under the Sixth
Amendment to the direct assistance of counsel.

See Heaton, 958

P.2d at 917 ("doubts concerning waiver must be resolved in the
defendant's favor"). The trial court's failure to properly attend
to this matter interfered with DeYoung's fundamental
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.
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CONCLUSION
As set forth in the opening Brief and herein, this case
should be reversed and remanded on the basis that the trial court
violated DeYoung's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of
counsel.
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